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IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
Amici curiae are 40 law and economics professors with exper-
tise at the intersection of antitrust law, intellectual property law, 
and industrial organization economics.1 Amici have no personal in-
terest in the outcome of this appeal, but they share a professional 
interest in seeing that this case—which has provoked heavy lobby-
ing and resulting controversy—is decided in accordance with well-
established legal principles and sound legal and economic analysis.2 
Amici draw on decades of experience, both in academia and in prac-
tice, studying exclusionary conduct and identifying the circum-
stances in which conduct might be anticompetitive and violate the 
antitrust laws.  
 
                                      
1 Appendix A includes a list of the amici.  
2 All parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Amici certify 
that no party or party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in 
part, no party or party’s counsel contributed money that was in-
tended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief, and no 
person or entity—other than amici or their counsel—authored the 
brief or made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submis-
sion.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The central issue in this case, and the focus of this brief, is 
Qualcomm’s so-called “no license, no chips” (“NLNC”) policy. Amici 
believe that the district court correctly determined that the NLNC 
policy violates Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
We begin with two fundamental principles. First, while intel-
lectual property rights provide incentives for invention, and while 
patents are different in some ways from other types of property, 
patents and patented products are subject to ordinary, sound, and 
well-established antitrust principles.3 Second, antitrust law should 
be applied to protect the competitive process and thereby benefit 
consumers. 
The district court found that Qualcomm has monopoly power 
in two markets (3G CDMA and 4G LTE) for modem chipsets used 
in mobile handsets. Qualcomm sells those chipsets to firms (original 
equipment manufacturers or “OEMs”) that manufacture handsets. 
The district court found that even the most powerful OEMs require 
                                      
3 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“[Microsoft] claims an absolute and unfettered 
right to use its intellectual property as it wishes . . . . That is no 
more correct than the proposition that use of one’s personal prop-
erty, such as a baseball bat, cannot give rise to tort liability.”); In re 
Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (“Intellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to vio-
late the antitrust laws.”). 
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Qualcomm’s chipsets—even those that use other manufacturers’ 
chipsets for some handsets still need Qualcomm’s chipsets for the 
remainder. 1ER0027-1ER0028, 1ER0033-1ER0034.4 
Qualcomm obtained its chipset monopolies lawfully and is en-
titled to charge high prices for its chipsets. But Qualcomm does not 
use its monopoly power solely in that way. It also uses its power to 
harm rivals and raise entry barriers to the chipset markets. That 
aspect of Qualcomm’s conduct—which maintains and enhances its 
chipset monopolies—is unlawful.  
Qualcomm also developed and patented important wireless 
technologies. It was entitled by patent law to keep those technolo-
gies for its own use or to license others to use them on terms that 
reflected their value. Qualcomm chose to license its patented tech-
nologies throughout the wireless industry.  
Firms in the wireless industry manufacture products in com-
pliance with industry-wide standards, so that handsets and other 
wireless products can interconnect. Had these standards incorpo-
                                      
4 Citations to “ER_” are to the excerpts of the record that Qualcomm 
filed on August 23, 2019. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 
19-16122 (9th Cir. Aug. 23, 2019), Dkt. Nos. 75-1 and 75-3. Cita-
tions to “SER_” are to the supplemental excerpts of the record that 
the Federal Trade Commission filed on November 22, 2019. Dkt. 
No. 139-1. Citations to “Qualcomm Br. at _” are to Qualcomm’s 
Opening Brief in this appeal. Dkt. No. 77-2. 
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rated alternatives to Qualcomm’s technologies, Qualcomm’s pa-
tents would have little if any value. It was, therefore, very im-
portant to Qualcomm to induce industry-leading standard-setting 
organizations (“SSOs”) to include its proprietary technologies in 
wireless standards. To achieve this goal, Qualcomm promised those 
SSOs that it would license its patents to “all applicants” on “fair, 
reasonable, and non-discriminatory” (“FRAND”) terms. SSOs re-
quire FRAND commitments to prevent holders of standard-essen-
tial patents (“SEPs”) from opportunistically “holding up” licensees, 
or keeping the technologies for themselves or a limited number of 
licensees and thereby creating monopoly power in standard-compli-
ant products, after the industry irreversibly coalesces around a 
standard. But for Qualcomm’s FRAND promise, SSOs would not 
have adopted its proprietary technologies into the standards. 
In reliance on Qualcomm’s FRAND promises, key SSOs incor-
porated its technologies into wireless standards. Qualcomm takes 
the position that its patented technologies are essential to those 
standards and, therefore, that any firm making or selling a stand-
ard-compliant product infringes its patents. As a result, the SSOs’ 
incorporation of Qualcomm’s patented technologies into wireless 
standards created a huge market for licenses to Qualcomm’s SEPs.  
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The district court held that Qualcomm used its chipset monop-
olies, not only to extract the high chipset prices to which it was en-
titled, but also to perpetuate those monopolies by disadvantaging 
rival chipmakers and raising entry barriers. As a matter of law and 
economics, that holding is sound. At its core, this is yet another in 
a long line of cases dating back to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Standard Oil of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), and 
more recently in United States v Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (en banc), and United States v. American Telephone & 
Telegraph Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), in which a monopo-
list violates the antitrust laws by using its market power to exclude 
rivals and entrench its monopoly. 
We address Qualcomm’s exclusionary conduct in two Parts. 
Part I explains why Qualcomm’s NLNC policy is unlawful under 
well-established antitrust principles. Part II discusses Qualcomm’s 
refusal to license chipset rivals, which reinforces the NLNC policy 
and violates the antitrust laws. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Qualcomm’s No License, No Chips Policy Is Unlawful. 
While the record in this case is complex in places, the legal and 
economic analysis is straightforward: Qualcomm uses the NLNC 
policy to make it more expensive for OEMs to purchase competitors’ 
chipsets, and thereby disadvantages rivals and creates artificial 
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barriers to entry and competition in the chipset markets. NLNC 
means that, if an OEM does not agree to Qualcomm’s preferred li-
censing terms and royalty (“no license”), Qualcomm will not sell the 
OEM any chipsets (“no chips”). The district court correctly con-
cluded that the NLNC policy is unlawful exclusionary conduct.   
A. Qualcomm’s NLNC policy is anticompetitive 
because it raises the costs of competitors’ 
chipsets and erects barriers to entry into the 
chipset markets. 
Qualcomm sells two things relevant to this case: chipsets and 
rights to practice its patents. The abuse of monopoly power at issue 
is based on Qualcomm’s monopoly power and conduct in the chipset 
markets. 
1. U.S. antitrust law allows Qualcomm to charge a monopoly 
price for its chipsets. Temporary high prices and healthy profits un-
til competition occurs reward firms that create innovative products 
that benefit consumers. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of 
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004). The possibility of 
high prices and profits from lawfully obtained market power can 
also spur competition by encouraging rivals to enter the monopo-
lized markets.   
U.S. patent law allows Qualcomm to charge royalties to others 
who wish to practice its patents. Various aspects of patent law and, 
in this case, contract law constrain these royalties. When a patent 
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holder like Qualcomm seeks to license its technologies, the negoti-
ations and resulting royalties reflect the value of the patented tech-
nologies discounted by the risk that a court would hold the patents 
to be invalid or not infringed if the parties do not agree on a royalty 
and the matter is resolved by litigation. These risks are often sub-
stantial: a recent study found that, when tested in litigation, a sig-
nificant majority of declared SEPs were found to be invalid or not 
infringed.5 The patent holder is not entitled to any royalties if the 
patent is invalid or not infringed. 
The parties’ assessment of the infringement damages that a 
court would award also constrains the royalties that a patent holder 
can charge. 35 U.S.C. § 283. In this case, Qualcomm’s voluntary 
FRAND commitments further constrain the negotiations, and limit 
the royalties that Qualcomm may collect for its patented technolo-
gies. 
2. The crux of this case is that Qualcomm uses its monopoly 
power in chipset markets to evade these constraints and extract 
royalties higher than those to which it is entitled and could other-
wise obtain. The increased royalties raise barriers to entry and ex-
clude competition in chipset markets, thereby unlawfully maintain-
ing Qualcomm’s chipset monopoly. 
                                      
5 Mark A. Lemley & Timothy Simcoe, How Essential Are Standard-
Essential Patents?, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 607, 624 (2019). 
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Qualcomm uses its NLNC policy to evade constraints on its pa-
tent royalties by threatening OEMs with chipset supply disruptions 
if they do not agree to Qualcomm’s preferred licensing terms.6 Be-
cause Qualcomm has monopoly power in the chipset markets and 
access to its chipsets is “critical” for a significant fraction of OEMs, 
OEMs have no choice but to acquiesce to Qualcomm’s licensing 
terms. 1ER0026; see also 1ER0030-1ER0031. As the district court 
found, Qualcomm extracts higher royalties from OEMs than it 
would otherwise obtain but for its abuse of its monopoly power in 
the chipset markets through the NLNC policy. 1ER0046, 1ER0184-
1ER0187 (describing this as a “surcharge”). As we explain below, 
the surcharge resulting from the NLNC policy raises rivals’ costs, 
erects entry barriers, and unlawfully inflates consumer prices.  
A hypothetical example illustrates how that happens. Suppose 
that the royalty Qualcomm would charge OEMs, if it licensed its 
SEPs separately from its chipsets, is $2 (taking into account the 
risk that the patents are invalid or not infringed, Qualcomm’s 
FRAND commitments, and the likelihood a court imposes a reason-
able royalty remedy in the event the parties resort to litigation). 
Suppose further that the monopoly price of Qualcomm’s chipset 
                                      
6 The district court detailed these threats against nearly every sig-
nificant OEM in the industry. 1ER0045-1ER0115. 
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plus royalty—the “all-in” price—is $20, meaning that the monopoly 
chipset price is $18.7 Suppose also that a new chipmaker entrant 
can manufacture chipsets of comparable quality at a cost of $11 
each. In that case, the rival chipmaker entrant could sell its chip-
sets to OEMs for slightly more than $11. An OEM’s all-in cost of 
buying from the new entrant would be slightly above $13 (i.e., a 
license royalty of $2 plus the entrant’s chipset price of slightly more 
than $11). This entry into the chipset market would induce price 
competition for chipsets. Qualcomm would still be entitled to its pa-
tent royalty of $2, but it could no longer charge the monopoly all-in 
price of $20. The entry and resulting price competition would force 
Qualcomm to reduce its chipset prices from $18 to somewhere closer 
to $11 so that its all-in price would be closer to that charged by the 
rival: $13. OEMs therefore would benefit from the competition by 
paying less for chipsets, and would pass along those savings to con-
sumers. 
                                      
7 As a practical matter, Qualcomm would probably charge a single 
all-in price of $20 for the chipset and the license. It would charge a 
separate $2 license fee only when the OEM used a competitor’s chip. 
The economic effect is the same, regardless of whether Qualcomm 
charges a single all-in price of $20 or $18 for the chipset and $2 for 
the license. 
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Qualcomm’s NLNC policy prevents this competition. To illus-
trate, suppose instead that Qualcomm implements the NLNC pol-
icy and charges a patent royalty of $10. Because the all-in monopoly 
price is $20, the chipset price would be $10. The all-in cost to an 
OEM that buys Qualcomm chipsets remains at the monopoly level 
of $20.8 But the OEM’s all-in cost of using the rival entrant’s chip-
sets will now be at least $21 (i.e., the price for the entrant’s chipset 
slightly higher than $11 plus the $10 royalty that the OEM must 
pay to Qualcomm). Because the cost of using the entrant’s chipsets 
now exceeds Qualcomm’s all-in monopoly price of $20, Qualcomm 
faces no competitive pressure to cut prices or compete on quality or 
innovation.9 
                                      
8 Because Qualcomm is using some of its monopoly power in chip-
sets to extract the surcharge on its patent royalties, its chipset price 
would be less than the standalone profit-maximizing price of $18. 
In fact, the district court found that Qualcomm, on a number of oc-
casions, explicitly reduced its chipset prices in order to induce 
higher patent royalties. 1ER0187, 1ER0189-1ER0191. Doing so did 
not reduce Qualcomm’s overall revenues, however, because it 
meant in effect that Qualcomm allocated some of the consideration 
for the chipsets to a higher price for the patent license. 
9 An OEM cannot respond to Qualcomm’s NLNC policy by purchas-
ing chipsets only from a rival chipset manufacturer and obtaining 
a license at the reasonable royalty level (i.e., $2 in the example) 
after Qualcomm brings an infringement action. That strategy 
would be infeasible because of Qualcomm’s chipset monopoly. As 
the district court found, OEMs needed to procure at least some 3G 
CDMA and 4G LTE chipsets from Qualcomm. 1ER0026, 1ER0030-
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3. This royalty surcharge injures competition in the chipset 
markets because it disadvantages existing rivals and raises barri-
ers to entry for new competitors. OEMs deciding whether to pur-
chase Qualcomm’s or a competitor’s chipset compare the all-in cost 
of purchasing either chipset. When Qualcomm uses its monopoly 
power in the chipset markets to increase what an OEM pays for the 
license—rather than charging a higher chipset price—it imposes 
artificial costs on rivals’ products that would not otherwise exist.10 
OEMs will either buy fewer chipsets from Qualcomm’s rivals or in-
sist that the rivals reduce chipset prices. In this way, the NLNC 
policy injures rivals by reducing their revenues and sales volume, 
and the record shows that it forced some rivals out of the market 
altogether. 1ER0207-1ER0208.11   
                                      
1ER0031. Monopolists that threaten to refuse to sell inputs to cus-
tomers who prefer to source some, but not all, of those inputs from 
rival suppliers have been found to violate Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act in other cases. E.g., ZF Meritor v. Eaton, 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 
2012); United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F. 3d 181 (3d Cir. 
2005). 
10 The competitive harm is a result of the royalty being higher than 
it would be absent the NLNC policy. It does not depend on whether 
the royalty exceeds the ceiling imposed by Qualcomm’s FRAND 
commitments. 
11 As an economic matter, Qualcomm’s NLNC policy is analogous to 
the use of a tying arrangement to maintain monopoly power in the 
market for the tying product (here, chipsets). See Dennis W. Carlton 
& Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use Of Tying To Preserve and 
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The surcharge burdens rivals, leads to anticompetitive effects 
in the chipset markets, deters entry, and impedes follow-on innova-
tion. As a result, Qualcomm maintains its monopoly power, and 
both OEMs and consumers lose the benefits of chipset competition 
and innovation. 
4. The NLNC policy is strikingly similar to the conduct con-
demned in the “per processor” royalty cases that Microsoft settled 
with the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and private plaintiffs in the 
1990s.12 At issue in those cases was Microsoft’s practice of imposing 
a charge on every unit of a particular computer model (i.e., “proces-
sor”) sold by computer OEMs, regardless of whether that unit in-
cluded Microsoft’s MS-DOS operating system (“OS”), so long as the 
OEM sold any computers of that model with MS-DOS. In effect, Mi-
crosoft extracted part of the consideration for its OS in the form of 
                                      
Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 194, 
205 (2002); Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 64-67 (technologically integrating 
Internet Explorer browser into the Windows operating system 
raised barriers to entry into the monopolized OS market in violation 
of Section 2); cf. Erik Hovenkamp, Tying, Exclusivity, and Stand-
ard-Essential Patents, 19 COL. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 79, 106 (2017) 
(explaining how a monopolist provider of an input could tie SEP 
licenses to that input as a means of maintaining its power in the 
input market). 
12 See Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact State-
ment, United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civ. No. 94-1564 (SS) 
(D.D.C. July 27, 1994), 59 Fed. Reg. 42845, 42849 (Aug. 19, 1994); 
Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (D. Utah 1999). 
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a surcharge on computers that used a rival’s OS. This practice 
raised the OEMs’ cost of selling a computer with a rival’s OS—for 
those machines, the OEMs had to pay to use the rival’s OS and pay 
a fee to Microsoft. This raised the all-in cost to OEMs of selling a 
computer with a rival’s OS in the same way that Qualcomm’s con-
duct makes it more expensive for an OEM to sell a handset that 
includes a non-Qualcomm chipset. See 3ER0668-3ER0669 (testi-
mony of FTC’s economist discussing the “per processor” case).  
5. Qualcomm offers three justifications for the NLNC policy. 
None is correct. 
First, Qualcomm argues that NLNC cannot injure competition 
because it charges the same royalty regardless of whose chipset an 
OEM uses. Qualcomm Br. at 63. But as in the per-processor cases, 
the royalties disparately impact OEMs’ chipset costs. As illustrated 
by the hypothetical example above, the surcharge raises an OEM’s 
all-in cost of rival chipsets even when it does not affect the all-in 
cost of Qualcomm chipsets. The NLNC policy in effect allocates 
some of the consideration for Qualcomm chipsets to the nominal 
patent royalty. In exchange for paying the higher nominal royalty, 
OEMs get a reduced nominal price on Qualcomm chipsets. But 
Qualcomm does not provide any such offset when the OEM buys 
chipsets from rivals. By allocating a larger portion of the all-in cost 
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to the royalty, Qualcomm in substance charges OEMs more if they 
use a competitor’s chipsets. 
Second, Qualcomm argues that the per-processor cases are dis-
tinguishable. It says that Microsoft’s policy—requiring OEMs to 
pay for MS-DOS even for computers configured with a rival’s OS—
is fundamentally different from the conduct at issue here, where 
OEMs allegedly practice Qualcomm’s SEPs even when they use a 
rival’s chipsets. Qualcomm Br. at 66-67. But Qualcomm misses the 
point of the per-processor cases: Microsoft violated the antitrust 
laws because it used its monopoly power to impose artificial costs 
on the use of a rival’s product. There is no substantive difference 
between imposing an artificial cost and describing it as part of the 
price for the OS used in different machines, as in the per processor 
cases, and imposing the same artificial cost (a surcharge) and de-
scribing it part of the price for a different product (patent license) 
sold to the customer.   
Third, Qualcomm argues that its NLNC policy is a lawful 
“price squeeze” under the Supreme Court’s decision in Pacific Bell 
Telephone v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009). 
Qualcomm Br. at 38-39. By setting a high price for an essential in-
put over which it has monopoly power and a low price for a finished 
product that incorporates that input, a vertically integrated firm 
can “squeeze” the margins of unintegrated producers of the finished 
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product, such that those producers cannot viably compete against 
the integrated monopolist. 
Qualcomm’s NLNC policy is not like the margin squeeze at is-
sue in linkLine in either form or substance. As to form, the input 
here is the license to Qualcomm’s SEPs, and the non-integrated 
competitors are the rival chipset manufacturers. Because Qual-
comm refuses to license chipset manufacturers, it is not squeezing 
them with a higher license fee. Similarly, Qualcomm does not sell 
handsets, so it cannot squeeze the OEMs with its handset prices. 
Moreover, the issue in linkLine was the abuse of power in the input 
market in which the alleged overcharge occurred. 555 U.S. at 450 
(“[T]he plaintiffs allege[] that the defendants (upstream monopo-
lists) abused their power in the wholesale market to prevent rival 
firms from competing effectively in the retail market.”). Here, by 
contrast, Qualcomm abused its monopoly power in the chipset mar-
kets, and extracted the resulting surcharge in the separate markets 
in which it licenses its SEPs to OEMs. Qualcomm is arguing that 
linkLine should be extended to a very different factual context. 
As to substance, the rationale of linkLine is that a defendant 
could not cause more harm by selling an input at a high price than 
by exercising its lawful right to refuse to deal in that market. Id. 
That rationale does not apply here. The NLNC policy results in an 
excessive input price for patent licenses sold to OEMs. Unlike the 
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monopolist in linkLine, Qualcomm could not inflict the same or 
worse harm by refusing to license its patents to OEMs because 
Qualcomm promised to license its SEPs on reasonable (FRAND) 
terms. If Qualcomm refuses to license its patents to OEMs, it would 
be entitled to no more than a FRAND-compliant royalty in litiga-
tion and would run the risk that a court will find its SEPs invalid 
or not infringed. The OEMs, and thus chipset rivals and new en-
trants, would obtain the benefit of the lower royalty and be better 
off than they are under the NLNC policy. 
B. The NLNC policy harms competitors and 
competition and enables Qualcomm to maintain 
its chipset monopoly power. 
Qualcomm’s principal defense of the NLNC policy is that, even 
though it increases competitors’ costs and harms individual com-
petitors, the record does not demonstrate the magnitude of the cost 
increase or how it harmed competition in chipset markets overall. 
Qualcomm Br. at 56-102. But a dominant firm that perpetuates its 
monopoly by artificially raising its rivals’ costs and erecting barri-
ers to entry injures the competitive process and violates the anti-
trust laws.13 The conduct violates the antitrust laws even if the 
                                      
13 E.g., Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 61, 64; Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 
F.3d 1467, 1478 (9th Cir. 1997), aff’d, 525 U.S. 299 (1999);  Conwood 
Co., L.P. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 788 (6th Cir. 
2002); see generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, 
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plaintiff does not demonstrate exactly how competition would have 
unfolded but for the anticompetitive conduct. This is true whether 
the monopolist targets its cost-raising conduct directly at rivals, as 
in Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1478 (9th Cir. 1997), or 
achieves the same result indirectly through conduct aimed at com-
mon potential customers, as in Microsoft or Conwood.14   
In any event, the district court found ample evidence of harm 
to competition. Qualcomm artificially increased the OEMs’ cost of 
rival chipsets for reasons unrelated to innovation, product develop-
ment, or any other efficiency. As the district court explained, the 
NLNC policy enables Qualcomm to impose “an artificial and anti-
competitive surcharge on the price of [its] rivals’ modem chips.” 
                                      
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs To Achieve Power 
over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); Janusz A. Ordover, Garth Sa-
loner, & Steven C. Salop, Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM. 
ECON. REV. 127 (Mar. 1990). 
14 Qualcomm argues that the NLNC policy is not anticompetitive 
because the cost is not levied directly on the competing chipset mak-
ers. Qualcomm Br. at 58. But as demonstrated by the Microsoft “per 
processor” royalty cases, there is no requirement that a monopolist 
impose costs directly on its competitor. See Caldera, 87 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1250; see also Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 61 (explaining how licensing 
restrictions that raised computer OEMs’ costs to pre-install a com-
petitor’s browser excluded potential rivals and unlawfully main-
tained Microsoft’s OS monopoly). What is significant is that the mo-
nopolist imposes a charge on the transaction involving the compet-
itor. 
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1ER0046. The court found that the surcharge excludes some com-
petitors outright, injures those that remain, harms OEMs and con-
sumers by raising costs, and erects barriers to future competition. 
1ER0046, 1ER0184, 1ER0203; see 1SER0103 (testimony of FTC’s 
economist describing anticompetitive effects). The surcharge sup-
presses sales of competing products “below the critical level neces-
sary for any rival to pose a real threat” to Qualcomm, thereby insu-
lating its chipset monopolies from competition. 1ER0185 (quoting 
Dentsply Int’l, 399 F.3d at 191).  
Qualcomm argues that the harm to competition is based on “in-
ference” rather than demonstrated harm, and that the inference is 
based on an implausible, indirect, multistep chain of causation. 
Qualcomm Br. at 69, 76-82. Whatever purchase this argument 
might have in a damages case, or even a case alleging the unlawful 
acquisition of monopoly power, it has no application to this case, in 
which the defendant is already a monopolist. 
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Microsoft—in which the court ad-
dressed Microsoft’s unlawful maintenance of its desktop OS monop-
oly (Windows)—demonstrates why the district court here was cor-
rect in finding the requisite harm to competition. The government’s 
theory, and the holding of the court, was that Microsoft engaged in 
anticompetitive conduct that increased OEMs’ costs of using rival 
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browsers, thereby reducing the likelihood that any rival’s browser 
would attract a large share of computer users.  
Microsoft’s worry was that a rival browser would achieve a crit-
ical mass of users so that computer applications developers would 
design applications to interoperate with the rival browser, and 
thereby permit users to access those applications through that 
browser regardless of which OS they were using. If applications in-
teroperated with the browser rather than with Windows, it would 
be easier for OS competitors to erode Microsoft’s OS monopoly be-
cause users would no longer need Windows to access the applica-
tions. The court held that Microsoft’s licensing agreements with 
OEMs harmed rivals in the browser market and thereby injured 
competition in the OS market by raising a barrier to, and reducing 
the likelihood of, future OS competition. The court concluded that 
the licensing agreements unlawfully maintained and perpetuated 
Microsoft’s OS monopoly in violation of Section 2. 
All of this harm to competition from the anticompetitive con-
duct was inference, and Microsoft—like Qualcomm here—argued 
that inference was not enough. The D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, 
unanimously rejected that argument, explaining in part that “[t]o 
require that § 2 liability turn on a plaintiff’s ability or inability to 
reconstruct the hypothetical marketplace absent a defendant’s an-
ticompetitive conduct would only encourage monopolists to take 
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more and earlier anticompetitive action” to protect their monopo-
lies. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 79.  
Instead, the court held, it was sufficient that Microsoft engaged 
in conduct that “decreas[ed] competition against” Microsoft’s 
browser, “ha[d] a substantial effect in protecting [its] market power, 
and d[id] so through a means other than competition on the merits.” 
Id. at 62. Even though there was only a potential, multi-step con-
nection between the harm to competing browsers and the mainte-
nance of Microsoft’s OS monopoly, that connection was sufficient 
because Microsoft’s anticompetitive conduct “reasonably ap-
pear[ed] capable of making a significant contribution to . . . main-
taining [its] monopoly power.” Id. at 79 (quoting 3 PHILIP AREEDA & 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 651c (1996)). “We may in-
fer causation,” the court said, “when exclusionary conduct is aimed 
at producers of nascent competitive technologies as well as when it 
is aimed at producers of established substitutes.” Id.15 
                                      
15 Qualcomm relies on language in Microsoft to the effect that the 
anticompetitive conduct must have “contributed significantly” to 
maintenance of the monopoly. Qualcomm Br. at 70 (quoting 253 
F.3d at 79). But Qualcomm misreads the case. The D.C. Circuit 
noted that Microsoft relied on that language from a treatise but 
went on to say in the very next sentence that it was inapplicable in 
a case seeking injunctive relief. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 79 (“But, with 
respect to actions seeking injunctive relief, the authors of that trea-
tise also recognize the need for courts to infer ‘causation’ from the 
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The harm to competition here is even more direct, more cer-
tain, and more clear from the record than was the harm in Mi-
crosoft. The NLNC policy raises the costs for OEMs that wish to 
purchase from rival chipmakers, 1SER0103; 1ER0106-1ER0107, 
harming those rivals by limiting their current sales and revenues 
and depriving them of experience needed for R&D and future prod-
uct improvement, 1ER0197. In some cases, rivals exited the market 
altogether. 1ER0207-1ER0208.  
In Microsoft, the browser path was only one possible avenue for 
potential OS competition, and browsers had never been used that 
way. By contrast, rival chipmakers already sell in certain market 
segments and can compete against Qualcomm only if their access 
to OEMs is unimpeded. It does not require the type of inferential 
leap that the court made in Microsoft to conclude that raising 
OEMs’ costs when they use rivals’ chipsets would act as a barrier 
to entry of new chipset competitors, reduce the likelihood of future 
competition, unlawfully maintain Qualcomm’s monopoly, and de-
prive consumers of the lower prices and increased innovation at-
tendant to competition.  
                                      
fact that a defendant has engaged in anticompetitive conduct that 
‘reasonably appear[s] capable . . . .’”). 
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Indeed, unlike Microsoft—where the court never found it nec-
essary to reach the issue of customer or consumer harm—the dis-
trict court in this case catalogued various ways in which the anti-
competitive effects of the NLNC policy rippled through the chain of 
distribution and injured OEMs, end-purchasers of handsets, and ri-
vals. See, e.g., 1ER0072, 1ER0184, 1ER0186.  
This is a monopoly maintenance case in which the FTC seeks 
forward-looking injunctive relief. It is enough that Qualcomm en-
gaged in anticompetitive conduct that “reasonably appear[s] capa-
ble of making a significant contribution to . . . maintaining [its] mo-
nopoly power.” Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 79. 
II. Qualcomm’s Refusal to License Rival Chipmakers 
Also Violates the Antitrust Laws.  
Qualcomm’s NLNC policy is itself unlawful. Qualcomm’s re-
fusal to license chipmakers is also unlawful, in part because it bol-
sters the NLNC policy.16 In addition, Qualcomm’s refusal to license 
chipmakers increases the costs of using rival chipsets, excludes ri-
vals, and raises barriers to entry even if NLNC is not itself illegal. 
                                      
16 Given space limitations, amici are unable to address other issues 
in this case. No inference should be drawn about amici’s views of 
issues not addressed in this brief. 
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A. Qualcomm’s refusal to license rival chipmakers 
is anticompetitive. 
While patent holders ordinarily are free to refuse to license 
their technology or to license it narrowly, this case is different. 
Qualcomm employs a business strategy of widespread licensing—
dedicating an entire business unit to the practice—and voluntarily 
promised two industry-wide SSOs that it would license its SEPs to 
“all applicants” on FRAND terms. And for a time, Qualcomm did 
just that, licensing all comers no matter where they appeared in the 
distribution chain. Yet Qualcomm subsequently changed course 
and now refuses to license rival chipmakers. That refusal is a sep-
arate form of anticompetitive conduct.17 
Qualcomm argues that its refusal to license is lawful because 
it did not violate the standards set out in Trinko or Aspen Skiing 
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985). Qual-
comm Br. at 46-51. But those cases involved simple, standalone re-
fusals to deal. Even then, Aspen Skiing held that the defendant’s 
refusal to deal was unlawful, and the Court in Trinko reaffirmed 
                                      
17 Qualcomm has appealed from the district court’s ruling that its 
FRAND commitments obligate it to license all applicants, including 
rival chipmakers. Qualcomm Br. at 130-39. To the extent that the 
argument in this Part is based on Qualcomm’s FRAND commit-
ments, it is based on the assumption that Qualcomm was required 
by contract law and those commitments to license all-comers. 
. 
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that “[u]nder certain circumstances, a refusal to cooperate with ri-
vals can constitute anticompetitive conduct and violate § 2.” Trinko, 
540 U.S. at 408. This case—in which Qualcomm made and later re-
pudiated a promise to license all-comers—is one of those “circum-
stances.”  
1. Unlike the refusal to deal in Trinko and Aspen Skiing, Qual-
comm’s refusal to license competitors does not stand alone, inde-
pendent of other anticompetitive conduct. Here, the refusal to  
license facilitates Qualcomm’s anticompetitive NLNC policy. Had 
Qualcomm continued to license rival chipmakers, downstream 
OEMs would have received pass-through rights to practice Qual-
comm’s SEPs through the principle of patent exhaustion. Impres-
sion Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1531 (2017). 
Under those circumstances, Qualcomm would have had no basis to 
insist that OEMs take a separate license to its SEPs, undermining 
the NLNC policy and frustrating its efforts to raise the costs of ri-
vals’ chipsets.  
To be sure, patent holders generally may decide whom to li-
cense. Qualcomm Br. at 55. But when a patent holder exercises that 
right in furtherance of unlawful, anticompetitive conduct—as Qual-
comm does here in support of its NLNC policy—the otherwise law-
ful behavior can violate the antitrust laws. Am. Tobacco Co. v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946); Image Tech. Servs., Inc. v. 
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Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1207 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding 
that “routine and legal . . . . actions, when taken by a monopolist, 
may give rise to liability if anticompetitive”).  
2. The policy concerns that drove the Supreme Court’s reluc-
tance to hold refusals to deal unlawful do not apply here. The Court 
explained in Trinko that it was concerned that finding a duty to 
deal under the antitrust laws would (1) create adverse incentives 
for rivals, like free riding; (2) force courts to determine terms of 
trade; (3) create increased risks of collusion; and (4) force monopo-
lists to share the rewards of their innovation, reducing their incen-
tives to invest. 540 U.S. at 407-08; see also MetroNet Servs. Corp. v. 
Qwest Corp., 383 F.3d 1124, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2004). None of those 
concerns applies here. 
First, this case involves SEPs, which means that normal con-
cerns about free-riding do not apply. Industry standards like those 
at issue here are intended to be available to all firms—competitors 
and non-competitors alike—to spur widespread adoption of, and fa-
cilitate competition in the development and sale of products imple-
menting, the standards. Accordingly, SSOs require that owners of 
patented technologies essential to implementation of the standards 
license those technologies to all comers. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, 
Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 876, 884 (9th Cir. 2012). Denying firms access to 
SEPs will exclude them from the market and prevent them from 
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using the patented technologies to compete on price or follow-on in-
novation and product improvements.  
Second, requiring Qualcomm to honor its FRAND commit-
ments does not force any court to act as a “central planner.” A court 
need only order licensing on FRAND terms, leaving Qualcomm and 
its competitors to negotiate rates in the shadow of the law. The 
court is merely a backstop if the parties fail to agree on those terms, 
just as courts are always a backstop when technology implementers 
and patent holders fail to agree on licensing terms and the patent 
holder initiates an infringement action for damages under the pa-
tent laws. And because the FRAND obligation is a binding contrac-
tual commitment, Id. at 884-85, any dispute about the proper 
FRAND royalty would be resolved by the courts in any event.   
Third, requiring Qualcomm to honor its FRAND commitments 
presents no undue risk of collusion. The parties need only discuss 
the royalty. Unlike Aspen Skiing (in which the refusal to deal was 
nonetheless found to be unlawful), the resulting interactions here 
would not require joint marketing or sale of consumer-facing prod-
ucts, see 472 U.S. at 589-90, nor would they require coordination 
regarding the introduction of a new competitor-facing service, see 
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410-11, or any discussion of output levels or 
chipset design. SEP licensing negotiations are commonplace and 
straightforward.  
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Finally, requiring Qualcomm to honor its FRAND commit-
ments will not compromise its incentives to innovate. It will con-
tinue to earn royalties and chipset profits in return for its invest-
ments in developing patented technology, and it will benefit from 
first-mover advantages and the opportunity to license firms in the 
vast markets opened to it by the incorporation of its patented tech-
nologies into industry standards—an inclusion made possible by, 
and in reliance upon, its FRAND commitments. Condemning a re-
fusal to deal in this context merely holds Qualcomm to a bargain 
that it willingly struck in exchange for SSOs’ adoption of its tech-
nology into industry standards, and in no way diminishes its right 
to obtain a reasonable royalty for others’ use of its SEPs.  
3. Qualcomm’s refusal to deal cannot be assessed inde-
pendently of that bargain, which was meant to protect the world-
wide wireless ecosystem from opportunistic hold up after it became 
locked into standardized technology. In refusing to license compet-
itors, Qualcomm undermined that protection and harmed competi-
tion.   
Qualcomm changed a voluntary course of conduct upon which 
an entire industry relied. The market shaped itself around Qual-
comm’s and others’ SEPs—designing products and technology with 
the understanding that Qualcomm’s patents would be available on 
Case: 19-16122, 11/27/2019, ID: 11514825, DktEntry: 153, Page 32 of 46
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3497133 
 — 27 — 
FRAND terms and with the expectation that there would be com-
petition at every level of the distribution chain. When Qualcomm 
abandoned its FRAND commitments by refusing to license rival 
chipmakers, it undermined the “entire competitive purpose of the 
[standard-setting] joint venture”—“to design a standard so that 
goods can be produced competitively within a shared technology”—
at a point when the industry had proceeded irreversibly down a 
path of technological development. See Herbert Hovenkamp, 
FRAND and Antitrust, 105 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), 
available at https://tinyurl.com/tx28q6f. 
Antitrust law condemns refusals to deal when a monopolist 
“make[s] an important change in the character of the market” by 
abandoning a prior course of conduct. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 604; 
see Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 
2007). And because Qualcomm “freely . . . exercise[d its] independ-
ent discretion” when agreeing to license all comers on FRAND 
terms, holding it to its own promise is not tantamount to “forced 
sharing.” Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408; see Qualcomm Br. at 47.   
FRAND commitments safeguard against opportunistic conduct 
resulting from other participants becoming locked-in to the stand-
ardized technology. They ensure that the holders of SEPs cannot 
extract unreasonably high royalties or otherwise hold up entire in-
dustries. Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 876; Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 314. By 
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refusing to license all comers, Qualcomm subverts those restraints 
in order to collect higher royalties from OEMs when they use rivals’ 
chipsets. That, in turn, harms rival chipmakers and raises barriers 
to chipset competition.   
The fact that Qualcomm’s FRAND commitments were contrac-
tual does not immunize its conduct from antitrust liability. See 
Qualcomm Br. at 52 & n.6. This Court has rejected the notion “that 
antitrust liability may not be predicated on conduct which also hap-
pens to create a contract dispute.” Vernon v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 955 
F.2d 1361, 1368 (9th Cir. 1992).18 The issue “is not simply” whether 
Qualcomm “breached its contract,” but rather whether—“by pre-
venting the purchase of” a product covered by that contract—Qual-
comm “acted anticompetitively.” See id. Qualcomm’s breach of its 
commitments, in the face of the industry-wide reliance they in-
duced, was anticompetitive. 
4. Invoking Aspen Skiing, Trinko, and subsequent lower court 
cases, Qualcomm argues that its refusal to license chipmakers does 
                                      
18 Vernon specifically distinguished a breach of contract “standing 
alone,” which does not give rise to antitrust liability (the language 
Qualcomm quotes in its brief), from anticompetitive conduct that 
also involves a breach of contract. 955 F.2d at 1368. Qualcomm’s 
breach of its contract to license all applicants is not simply a private 
dispute between rivals. Its FRAND breach also harms consumers 
and the competitive process by raising entry barriers into the chip-
set market. 
Case: 19-16122, 11/27/2019, ID: 11514825, DktEntry: 153, Page 34 of 46
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3497133 
 — 29 — 
not violate the antitrust laws because it did not sacrifice short-term 
profits when it abandoned its FRAND commitments. Qualcomm Br. 
at 48-50. As explained above, however, those cases are inapposite: 
Qualcomm’s breach of its commitments was anticompetitive re-
gardless of profit sacrifice, because of the industry-wide reliance 
that it induced and then exploited. 
Moreover, the royalties Qualcomm charges OEMs are inflated 
in large part because of its unlawful NLNC policy. Nothing in Aspen 
Skiing or Trinko suggests that a firm can avoid liability for a refusal 
to deal on the ground that it found a more profitable way to violate 
the antitrust laws. 
Last but not least, Qualcomm’s argument ignores its FRAND 
commitments.19 The Court in Trinko held that the refusal to deal 
at issue was not unlawful because there was no allegation that the 
defendant “would ever have [dealt with its rivals] absent statutory 
compulsion.” 540 U.S. at 409. Here, by contrast, Qualcomm volun-
tarily promised to license on FRAND terms.20  
                                      
19 As here, the duty to deal in Aspen Skiing “was rooted in specific 
prior [contractual obligation], reliance and path dependence, and 
subsequent repudiation.” Hovenkamp, FRAND and Antitrust, at 
30. 
20 If Qualcomm made the promise without intending to comply, and 
the SSOs had relied on that promise, Qualcomm would have unlaw-
fully acquired monopoly power in the technology markets that en-
compass its SEPs. See Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 314. 
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If Qualcomm had not promised to license all comers on FRAND 
terms, its patented technology would have been excluded from in-
dustry standards, rendering the patents nearly valueless when the 
industry coalesced around standards that incorporated different 
technologies—an outcome the district court found possible here. 
1ER0195-1ER0196. Refusing to be bound by FRAND in that way 
would entail a huge profit sacrifice for Qualcomm, in comparison to 
making and honoring a promise to license all applicants in ex-
change for a reasonable royalty.21 
B. Qualcomm’s refusal to license chipmakers harms 
competition. 
Qualcomm’s refusal to license injures competition by increas-
ing the costs to OEMs of buying competitors’ chipsets and exacer-
bating the anticompetitive effects of the NLNC policy. Like NLNC, 
it is anticompetitive conduct that “reasonably appear[ed] capable of 
making a significant contribution to . . . maintaining [Qualcomm’s] 
monopoly power” in the chipset markets. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 
79 (quoting AREEDA & HOVENKAMP ¶ 651c). Qualcomm’s refusal to 
license chipmakers therefore violated the antitrust laws, both as an 
                                      
21 See A. Douglas Melamed & Carl Shapiro, How Antitrust Law Can 
Make FRAND Commitments More Effective, 127 YALE L.J. 2110, 
2118 (2018); Carl Shapiro & Hal R. Varian, Information Rules: A 
Strategic Guide to the Network Economy 228 (1999). 
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integral part of its unlawful NLNC policy and, even if NLNC was 
not illegal, because it impaired the opportunities of rivals.22  
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the district 
court’s judgment that Qualcomm’s NLNC policy and its refusal to 
license rival chipmakers violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
  
                                      
22 “In a monopolization case conduct must always be analyzed ‘as a 
whole.’ A monopolist bent on preserving its dominant position is 
likely to engage in repeated and varied exclusionary practices. Each 
one viewed in isolation might be viewed as de minimis or an error 
in judgment, but the pattern gives increased plausibility to the 
claim.” AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 310c7 (4th ed. 
2013-2018).  
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